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Abstract 
We extend  the standard  evaluation  framework  to allow for interactions  between 
individuals within segmented markets.  An individual’s outcome depends not only on 
the assigned treatment status but also on (features of) the distribution of the assigned 
treatments in his market.  To evaluate how the distribution  of treatments within a 
market causally aﬀects the average eﬀect within the market,  averaged over the full 
population,  we  develop  an  identiﬁcation  and  estimation  method  in  two  steps.  The 
ﬁrst  one  focuses  on  the  distribution  of  the  treatment  within  markets  and  between 
individuals and the second step addresses the distribution of the treatment between 
markets.  We apply our method to data on training programs for unemployed workers 
in France. We use a rich administrative register of unemployment and training spells as 
well as the information on local labor demand that is used by unemployment agencies 
to allocate training programs.  The results show that the average treatment eﬀect on 
the employment rate causally decreases with respect to the proportion of treated in the 
market.  Our analysis accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between markets (using 
the longitudinal dimension of the data) and, in a robustness check, between individuals. 
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 1  Introduction 
Treatment evaluation methods borrowed from the statistical literature under the banners 
“matching” and “propensity score matching” have now become an integral part of the applied 
econometrician’s  toolkit.1  These  techniques,  revolving  around  the  Rubin  model  (1974), 
require  two  assumptions.  The  ﬁrst  one  is  a  conditional  independence  assumption  (CIA 
thereafter) in order to control for confounding factors that drive both the assignment to 
treatment and the potential outcomes. The second assumption, referred to as the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA thereafter), rules out any inﬂuence of an individual’s 
treatment status on another individual’s potential outcome (see Neyman, 1923, or Rubin, 
1986). Recently, the latter has been receiving increasing attention from economists, as many 
features pertaining to social sciences in general and economics in particular are likely to 
generate interactions between individuals with diﬀerent treatment statuses.  This includes 
peer eﬀects,  neighborhood eﬀects,  network eﬀects and the dispersion of information,  and 
various kinds of equilibrium eﬀects of policy interventions in e.g.  the labor market or the 
education system (below we discuss the literature in more detail). 
In the ﬁrst half of this paper, we develop a general framework to estimate average treat­
ment eﬀects that takes account of possible interactions between individuals, and that, indeed, 
estimates the magnitude of the interaction eﬀects.  The “matching” approach to evaluation 
constitutes the point of departure for our framework.  Accordingly, it is designed for cases 
where the data are not based on randomized experiments.  Consider a population divided 
into “markets”. A market can be deﬁned as a set of agents whose outcomes may depend on 
the treatment statuses of the other agents in the set, whereas there is no such interaction 
with agents outside of the set.  Conceptually, the individual treatment operates at two lev­
els:  individuals and markets.  If a CIA at the individual level holds within a given market, 
either using an experimental design, or by conditioning on a relevant set of confounders, or 
by exploiting some other feature of the data (for instance a panel), then average potential 
outcomes of treated and non-treated individuals can be estimated.  However, if the SUTVA 
does not hold,  these are only valid for the actual observed distribution of the treatment 
within this market.  We deal with this by extending the standard potential outcome model 
(the Rubin model, 1974) to allow an individual’s outcome to be a function not only of his 
own treatment status but also of the distribution of the treatment in his market. We specif­
ically aim at the estimation of (i) the causal eﬀect of the fraction of treated individuals in a 
market (or any other feature of the treatment distribution) on the average treatment eﬀect 
in the market, and (ii) the causal eﬀect of treatment on the individual outcome.  We aim 
1See e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a review. 
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 to estimate the former causal eﬀect as a function of the fraction of treated in the market, if 
the market invariably has the same composition as the population of individuals.  In cases 
where the individual treatment consists of the exposure to a particular policy intervention, 
like participation in a training program, this function is of obvious interest for policy makers. 
It captures information that is necessary for any decision on the extent to which a program 
should be rolled out in the eligible population.  Accordingly, it is important to have an es­
timation method for this function that is valid in case of non-experimental data, and it is 
important to be precise about the underlying assumptions for such a method. 
Our method involves two consecutive steps:  one within each market, and one across all 
markets.  To achieve identiﬁcation,  we need a CIA at each step.  The ﬁrst step consists 
of the estimation of mean potential outcomes within each market separately.  The market 
outcomes are the mean potential outcomes estimated in the ﬁrst step. We deﬁne the market 
treatment as some relevant moment(s) of the distribution of the treatment.  For instance, 
with a binary treatment, we only need to consider the proportion of treated in each market. 
Using a second CIA to control for confounders driving the assignment to market treatments 
and potential outcomes, we can then recover the causal eﬀect of the treatment distribution 
within a market on the average treatment eﬀect in the market, if the market has the same 
composition as the population of individuals.  As with “matching” techniques in general, 
our approach deals with heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects. In our framework, this concerns 
heterogeneity across individuals as well as across markets. 
In fact, the approach is suﬃciently ﬂexible to leave room for a wide set of alternative 
techniques within each step. If a stage involves non-experimental data, we can also resort to 
structural models or econometric techniques (for instance panel data techniques) to estimate 
treatment eﬀects at this stage. This may be useful if the corresponding CIA is hard to justify. 
However, depending on the technique, it may restrict the extent to which eﬀect heterogeneity 
is allowed. 
In the second part of the paper, we apply our approach to study the eﬀects of participation 
in a training program for unemployed workers in France on their probability to move to 
employment.  In this setting,  markets are deﬁned by occupational,  spatial,  and temporal 
indicators.  One may expect the fraction of treated individuals in a market to inﬂuence the 
magnitude of the individual eﬀect of participation.  First, if many individuals are treated 
then there may be crowding out among trained individuals applying for the same vacancies 
whereas the reverse may occur for untrained individuals. This may cause the average eﬀect to 
decline as a function of the fraction of treated individuals. Secondly, if many individuals are 
treated then there may be a response from the other side of the market. For example, ﬁrms 
may substitute vacancies for non-trained workers by vacancies for skilled workers. Whether 
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 this causes the average eﬀect to increase or decrease as a function of the fraction of treated 
individuals depends on the ﬁrms’ production function and on the wage determination in the 
market (see below for some literature). In the empirical analysis we set out to determine the 
precise shape of the average eﬀect as a function of the fraction of treated individuals. 
We use a register data set containing detailed information on unemployment and training 
spells in France at the individual level.  These data are non-experimental.  To produce our 
non-parametric benchmark results for within-market average eﬀects, we follow the matching 
literature and make use of a rich set of covariates to ensure conditional independence between 
treatment and potential outcomes. We use the longitudinal dimension of our data to compute 
indicators of an individual’s unemployment and training histories.  While we evaluate the 
training programs over the period 2002-2006, our data go back as far as 1990, so we know 
how much time each worker spent in unemployment and/or in a training program in the 
years preceding his current unemployment spell.  We view this information as important in 
order to capture individual confounders that may aﬀect the actual treatment assignment. 
We follow Hirano and Imbens (2001) and use an augmented version of the weight estimator 
of Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) for the estimation. 
At the market level, we need to ensure that no unobserved confounder drives both the 
proportion of individuals going through a training program and the average unemployment 
duration when treated or non-treated.  To this end, we use two distinctive features of our 
data.  First, we have unique information on local labor demand.  We merge our data with a 
survey from the French national unemployment agency where ﬁrms report their job open­
ing predictions for the coming year at very precise geographical and occupational levels. 
This survey contains the information actually used by caseworkers to assign unemployed 
workers to training programs.  Second, we follow local labor markets (deﬁned as a pair oc­
cupation/region) through time, so we observe each market under several treatment regimes 
(i.e.  with diﬀerent proportions of treated).  This allows us to control for a ﬁxed unobserved 
market eﬀect in the distribution of treatment across markets.  Since the treatment at the 
market level is continuous, we base our second-step estimation on Hirano and Imbens (2004) 
and match markets on the generalized propensity score. 
We also consider non-matching estimators at the individual level, to address a concern 
that we may not capture all selective unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. Using 
the Timing-of-Events approach devised by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), we are able to 
account for unobserved individual features driving assignment to training and unemployment 
durations. We can then compute the potential individual outcomes in each market and run 
our second step. This latter approach yields results that are qualitatively similar to the ones 
using the matching technique. 
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 We should mention that we can only make some speculative remarks about the mecha­
nisms through which the treatment and its distribution impact individuals and markets. To 
investigate this further may require the estimation of a structural economic model and/or 
additional data speciﬁc to the empirical application, and we feel that this would be beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, and this is an additional key contribution of this paper, by 
showing evidence of treatment spillovers on a very large scale we provide empirical support 
to the literature on equilibrium eﬀects of treatments. 
We end this section by discussing some relevant previous and concurrent literature on 
the evaluation of treatments in the presence of interactions or interference.  During the last 
decade, interest in such evaluations has been growing in economics as well as in epidemiology 
and sociology.  Somewhat loosely, one may distinguish between three bodies of work, where 
in  fact  these  are  highly  related.  The  ﬁrst  of  these  concerns  studies  of  the  eﬀect  of  an 
intervention program on group-level outcomes using data from ﬁeld experiments in which 
the assignment of programs to groups (i.e., markets) is randomized or natural experiments. 
In this setting, ideally, the average eﬀect can be directly estimated from sample averages. For 
example, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) analyze population eﬀects of cash transfers to some 
households in the context of the Progresa program in Mexico.  Duﬂo, Dupas and Kremer 
(2008) exploit randomization across schools and across classes in Kenya to study the eﬀect of 
tracking. Fr¨ olich and Michaelowa (2005) evaluate the eﬀects of textbooks on pupils and their 
classmates in ﬁve African countries. Miguel and Kremer (2004) use the random allocation of 
a medical treatment across villages and distance between these villages to reveal treatment 
spillovers. The approach has also been used to study neighborhood eﬀects (see Oakes, 2008, 
for an overview). Evaluation studies of active labor market policies (ALMP hereafter) have 
not followed this approach for lack of experimental data.  A notable exception is Blundell, 
Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2004) which uses eligibility rules and the timing of 
implementation across regions to detect equilibrium eﬀects of a job search program in the 
United Kingdom. Lechner (2002) studies whether the treatment participation probability is 
a source of heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect, but this link is not discussed in light of the 
SUTVA. 
A second body of work considers group treatments that consist of the assignment of a 
within-group composition, and their eﬀect on a group-level outcome (see Graham, Imbens 
and Ridder, 2009). For example, one may be interested in the causal eﬀect of the classroom 
gender  composition  on  the  average  school  grades  outcome.  In  this  case  the  fraction  of 
individuals with a certain characteristic is assigned to a group, but these characteristics are 
seen as inalienable, so that the individual eﬀect of a counterfactual switch of the individual 
characteristic  is  not  of  primary  interest.  Graham,  Imbens  and  Ridder  (2009)  provide  a 
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 careful discussion of the CIA needed in case of non-experimental data. Graham, Imbens and 
Ridder (2006) demonstrate how to use estimates to assess optimality of allocation schemes. 
These studies emphasize the importance of conditioning on group-level confounders. 
Recently, some studies have recognized the beneﬁts of a two-dimensional evaluation ap­
proach,  in cases where every individual is potentially subject to an individual treatment 
as well as to interactions, and where potential outcomes depend on both, and where the 
interest is in the individual counterfactual eﬀect as well as in the interaction eﬀects. Philip­
son (2000) devises two-stage randomization schemes for experimental studies. Hudgens and 
Halloran (2008) deﬁne a range of causal eﬀects using potential outcomes if there are two 
groups, and they develop estimators for the case of fully randomized assignments. (Hudgens 
and Halloran, 2008, also contains a short overview of older studies with two levels based on 
linear regression model speciﬁcations.)  Manski (2009) also deﬁnes such causal eﬀects with 
social interactions, and he considers various restrictions on the type of interactions and their 
implications. 
Clearly, our paper builds on these three bodies of work as we develop a two-dimensional 
evaluation approach in non-experimental contexts. In our setting, the interest is in the eﬀect 
of the fraction of treated, as well as the eﬀect of treatment itself, on the individual outcome. 
Our estimation method is non-parametric, and the empirical application is highly relevant 
for labor market policy. 
We should also mention a fourth body of work, which involves the estimation and cali­
bration of structural equilibrium models that aim at quantifying speciﬁc pathways through 
which the treatment may impact the market or the economy. Heckman, Lochner and Taber 
(1998) study equilibrium eﬀects of tuition policies. Lise, Seitz and Smith (2005) and Cahuc, 
Cr´ epon,  Guitard and Gurgand (2008) evaluate ALMP, and Albrecht,  Van den Berg and 
Vroman (2009) evaluate equilibrium eﬀects of adult education programs.  Topa (2001) uses 
the structural econometric approach to address social network interactions and spillovers in 
the labor market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the statistical model and deﬁnes the 
outcomes of interest. Section 3 presents our two-step identiﬁcation and estimation strategy. 
Section 4 introduces our empirical application: the institutional setting for training programs 
in France, the data, and the econometric speciﬁcation.  Section 5 presents our benchmark 
estimation results.  Section 6 contains our main robustness check where we use the Timing­
of-Events model to explicitly account for individual unobserved heterogeneity.  Section 7 
concludes. Additional robustness checks are in the Appendix. 
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 2	  A  model  to  evaluate  treatment  eﬀects  at  the  indi­
vidual and market level 
2.1  Treatments, outcomes, and markets 
The economy is segmented into M isolated markets. We assume that an individual belongs 
to only one market and we denote the population of market m by Nm.  An observation 
consists of a pair (i, m) where i denotes the individual and m = m(i) the market where i 
evolves (we will also use the notation i ∈ m when m(i) = m). 
We consider a binary treatment and deﬁne the dummy Z  equal to one for individuals 
who have received the treatment and to zero for the others.2  We also deﬁne an indicator of 
the treatment at the market level:  let Pm  be any function of the vector [Zi]i∈m  such that 
(i) Pm  is the same for all individuals in a given market, and (ii) Zi  is not a deterministic 
function of Pm(i). The former restriction states that the distribution of the treatment at the 
market level is the same for all individuals in a given market.  The latter restriction rules 
out all cases, such as Pm = [g(Zi)]i∈m  with g strictly monotone, for which Z does not bring 
additional information with respect to Pm. Notice that Pm can be multi-dimensional. In our 
empirical application, we will take Pm to equal the proportion of actually treated in a given 
market: 
1 
Pm = Ei∈m(Zi) =  · 
�
Zi.	  (1)
Nm  i∈m 
We will often refer to this speciﬁcation of P  for illustration purposes. For notational conve­
nience, we write Pm = 0 if no treatment is introduced in market m. 
The individual outcome is denoted by Yi  and depends on the treatment through Z but 
also through the market variable P : 




.	  (2) 
If the SUTVA holds (see Rubin, 1986), then an individual’s potential outcome is not aﬀected 
by the treatment status of other individuals. In that case, Yi does not depend on Pm(i). More 
in general, we allow for treatment externalities across individuals within a market (through 
P ),  but we assume that there are no spillovers between markets,  i.e.  the distribution of 
outcomes Y  in a market does not depend on the values of P or Z in other markets. In eﬀect, 
this dictates the appropriate operationalization of the “market” concept. 
2What follows could be extended to the case of a continuous treatment. 
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2.2  Potential outcomes and average treatment eﬀects 
In line with the above notation, we deﬁne Yi(z, p) as the potential outcome for individual 
i that applies if we assign values z, p to Zi  and Pm(i), respectively.  The evaluation of the 
causal eﬀect of p on the average treatment eﬀect in the market is based on the averages of 
these individual potential outcomes, 
Yz,p = EmEi∈m [Yi (z, p)] ,  ∀(z, p).  (3) 
The expectation in (3) is taken over individuals in a given market and then over all markets 
in the economy, where we weigh the average across markets by the market size as deﬁned 
by the measure of eligible individuals in the market.  For notational convenience we omit 
the latter weights (this applies to all expressions below).  Accordingly, Yz,p  as a function of 
p captures the average potential outcome corresponding to the individual treatment status 
z as a function of the market treatment dimension p (the fraction of treated in the market), 
if the market invariably has the same composition as the population of eligible individuals. 
These functions p → Yz,p  for z = 0, 1 are the objects in which we are primarily interested. 
Obviously, if the SUTVA holds, and if p is a scalar, we have dY1,p/dp = dY0,p/dp = 0. 
The functions Yz,p  directly lead to average treatment eﬀects, 
δ
z,z









fully describes the eﬀects of the treatment.3  For instance, δ
1,1  �





gives the variation in the expected outcome of treated (resp.  non treated) individuals 
when going from p to p� . The parameter δ
1,0  compares the average outcome of being treated  p,p
when P = p with that of not being treated when P = p� .  At the limit p� = 0, no treatment 
is introduced, so δ
1,0  is the average eﬀect of being treated with P  = p as compared to the  p,0 
situation where no treatment is introduced at all.  This latter parameter and δ
0,0  are of p,0 
importance for policy makers, as they indicate the “pure” eﬀect on treated and non-treated 
individuals of the introduction of a treatment with a market dimension p. 
Standard matching applications usually compare pairs of treated and untreated individ­
uals facing the same local market conditions.  Ideally, the treatment and control groups are 
in the same market. This literature is therefore concerned with the average treatment eﬀect 
δ1,0 4 
p,p.  In principle, the results are only valid for a given value of p,  and for the composition 
of the sub-population of individuals in the market under consideration. It is not possible to 
0,1 1,0 3Note that δ = −δ .  p,p�  p� p
 
1,0 0,0 0,0
 4Note that δ1,0 = δ − δ We have δ = 0 only if the counterfactual Y0,p gives an accurate picture of  p,p  p,0  p,0 .  p,0 
what would have happened had the treatment not been introduced at all, i.e. if it equals Y0,0. If the SUTVA 
does not hold, this will not be the case. 
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 �
extrapolate the results to other values of p if the SUTVA is violated. For instance, if a given 
study ﬁnds a positive average treatment eﬀect (ATE) and then advocates an increase in the 
proportion of individuals being treated, it could be that the resulting ATE under the new 
value of p diﬀers from the one initially estimated. Formally, deﬁning P with (1), if one ﬁnds 
δ1,0 1,0 
p,p  > 0 and consequently P  is increased from p to p�, the new ATE δp ,p�  can be smaller or 
larger than δ1,0 . p,p
3  Identiﬁcation and estimation 
Our objects of interest are (functions of) the average potential outcomes Yz,p.  For a given 




so we face a standard missing observation problem. 
In our setting, this problem has two dimensions: ﬁrst, we do not observe the outcome of an 
individual with Zi = z had he received 1 − z, and second, we do not know what would have 
happened in a market m with Pm = p had this market been assigned to a treatment policy 
regime p� �= p. We derive a two-step method for identiﬁcation and estimation that explicitly 
accounts for these two levels. First we present two unconfoundedness assumptions that allow 
identiﬁcation of Yz,p  from the data. After that we present the two-step estimation method. 
3.1  Identiﬁcation 
We make two unconfoundedness assumptions:  one at the individual level and one at the 
market level. The ﬁrst assumption states that, conditionally on a set of market characteristics 
denoted by W , the allocation of P  across markets is independent of the average potential 
outcomes of treated and non-treated workers within each market: 
Ei∈m[Yi(z, p)]  ⊥  Pm  |  Wm,  ∀m, z, p.  (5) 
Basically, this assumption takes markets as units. P is a market treatment, and Ei∈m[Y (z, p)] 
are the market outcomes of interest. 
The second unconfoundedness assumption states that within each market m, the alloca­
tion of treatment Z across individuals does not depend on the potential outcomes condition­
ally on a set of individual characteristics denoted by X: 
Yi (z, Pm)  ⊥  Zi  |  Xi,  ∀z, i ∈ m.  (6) 
Assumption (6) is the usual CIA that economists have used in the evaluation of treatments 
using matching estimators. 
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 In an experimental setting, it is possible to ensure that (5) and (6) hold.  With observa­
tional data, it is an empirical question whether the set of conditioning variables for the two 
CIA’s is suﬃcient. As we shall see, one may use longitudinal dimensions of the data (at both 
the market and the individual level) to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics. 
We return to this issue in Sections 4 and 6. 
Under  assumptions  (5)  and  (6),  we  can  identify  (functions  of)  the  average  potential 
outcomes Yz,p  by way of 




EX|m [Ei∈m(Yi|Xi = x, Zi = z)] |Wm = w, Pm = p
�� 
.  (7) 
This equality follows from: 
Yz,p  =  Em {Ei∈m[Yi(z, p)]} 
=  EW [Em {Ei∈m[Yi(z, p)]|Wm = w}] 
=  EW [Em {Ei∈m[Yi(z, Pm)]|Wm = w, Pm = p}] 




EX|m {Ei∈m[Yi(z, Pm)|Xi = x]}|Wm = w, Pm = p
�� 




EX|m {Ei∈m[Yi(Zi,Pm)|Xi = x, Zi = z]}|Wm = w, Pm = p
�� 
, 
where (5) allows to go from the second to the third line while (6) allows to go from the 
fourth to the last line.  The last line equals the right-hand side of equation (7), which is an 
observable quantity. 
Notice again that the expectations over markets and over W are weighted by the market 
size (as deﬁned by the measure of eligible individuals in the market) such that the terms in 
the above equalities capture averages over the full population of eligible individuals. 
It may be useful to provide some intuition for the above result.  Our line of reasoning 
follows the above set of equalities in reverse order, from the bottom to the top.  In a given 
market, conditional on X = x, it is a pure coincidence whether the individual receives the 
treatment z or not. The average potential outcome after treatment for all individuals in that 
market with X = x and with a given P  is then equal to the average outcome of those with 
X  = x who were actually treated in that market.  For a given P  and X, any alternative 
subset of individuals receiving the treatment in this market would produce the same average 
outcome as the average outcome among the actual treated. This can be aggregated over all 
X in the market. Next, conditional on W = w, it is a pure coincidence whether the market 
receives a high value p of P or not. In any other market with W = w, the average potential 
outcomes for z  = 0 and z  = 1 if it had been exposed to p are then equal to the average 
potential outcomes in the market that actually received the value p. This can be aggregated 
over W  to obtain population-level averages. 
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 This line of reasoning carries a caveat for empirical applications, namely that it is im-
portant that Wm  includes indicators of the distribution of X  in the market m.  Without 
this, the CIA (5) entails that the allocation of treatments to markets is not driven by the 
market composition in terms of characteristics that aﬀect potential outcomes and, possibly, 
cause self-selection into treatments.  The latter scenario is often not realistic.  Consider the 
training program setting of our empirical analysis.  In reality, if a market contains many 
discouraged workers who are not suﬃciently motivated to search for a job without any sup­
plementary training, then the policy makers may choose to allocate a relatively high budget 
for training for that market. If individual past labor market outcomes capture the degree of 
discouragement, then those past outcomes (X) may aﬀect potential outcomes and, possibly, 
the treatment status, and the distribution of X may aﬀect P . 
If the evaluation framework is dynamic, with treatments and outcomes being outcomes of 
stochastic processes over time, then identiﬁcation also requires a “no-anticipation” assump­
tion. See Cr´ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den Berg (2009) for details. This assumption is 
often not explicitly addressed in studies based on the “matching” approach.  We follow this 
convention. We return to this in Section 6. 
3.2  Estimation 
Let the data consist of a sample of individuals i. For each individual, we observe his treatment 
status Zi,  his outcome Yi  and his observed characteristics Xi.  Moreover,  we observe the 
individual’s market m(i) as well as the characteristics of this market Wm(i)  and the market 
dimension of the treatment Pm(i).  To make the presentation clearer, we now assume that 
Pm(i)  is a scalar. Our main purpose is to compute the estimate deﬁned by (7). To this end, 
we suggest a two-step estimation method based on assumptions (5) and (6).  The ﬁrst step 
consists in estimating the average individual outcome Ei∈m [Yi (z, Pm)] for all markets and 
z  = 0, 1.  The second step considers the quantities E Þ
i∈m [Yi (z, Pm)] estimated in the ﬁrst 
step and evaluates the eﬀect of treatment P  on these market outcomes. 
First  step:  estimation  at  the  individual  level.  We  want  to  estimate  the  average 
individual potential outcomes within each market.  To this end, we ﬁrst use the result of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which states that assumption (6) implies: 
Yi (z, Pm)  ⊥  Zi  |  p(Xi,m),  ∀z, i, m = m(i)  (8) 
where  p(x, m)  is  the  propensity  score:  the  probability  of  being  treated  conditionally  on 
having  individual  characteristics  x.  We allow  for  one  propensity  score  function  for  each 
market. 
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 We  use  a  weighted  regression  estimator  which  combines  two  methods:  the  approach 
based on regressing the outcome on the treatment variable and the covariates (see Rubin, 
1977) and the weight estimator developed by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003). The latter 
consists in computing an estimate of the average outcome for the treated as the market 
average  of  Z · Y/p Þ(X, m)  where  p Þ is  an  estimate  of  the  propensity  score.  Likewise,  the 
outcome for the non treated is estimated by the average of (1 − Z) · Y/ (1 − p Þ(X, m)).  The 
weighted estimator can thus be seen as a weighted regression of Y  on Z using the weights 
[Z/p Þ(X, m) + (1 − Z)/ (p Þ(X, m))]
1/2 .  The  weighted  regression  estimate  we  use  is  just  an 
extension of this weight estimator where we augment the weighted regression by adding the 
covariates X. This type of estimators has been introduced by Robins and Ritov (1997) and 
was implemented in Hirano and Imbens (2001).  For each market m, we run the following 
regression: 
Yi = µm + Xi 
� · βm + τm · Zi + ui, i ∈ m,  (9) 
using the weights [Zi/p Þ(Xi,m) + (1 − Zi)/ (p Þ(Xi,m))]
1/2 .  Denoting the resulting estimates 
as (µ Þm,β Þ
m,τ Þ m), we compute the market outcomes as: 
1 
E Þ




µ Þm + Xi 
� · β Þ








µm + Xi 
� · β Þ
m.  (10) 
i∈m 
Þ
The empirical implementation of these estimates raises dimensionality issues of two sorts. 
The ﬁrst one is the degree of the factor series in the estimation of the propensity score. There 
is a conﬂict between the high order required by the eﬃciency of the estimator on the one 
hand (see Hirano, Imbens and Ridder, 2003), and the number of observations and the size of 
the X vector on the other. The second issue is prominent for our approach, since we need to 
estimate a propensity score for each market m. If some markets are small, it is not possible 
to run an estimation of the propensity score for each m. In Subsection 4.3 and Appendix B 
we show how to choose speciﬁcations to overcome this issue. 
Second step: estimation at the market level.  Next, we average the estimates E Þ
i∈m [Y (z, Pm)] 
across markets, assuming that the market treatment P  is randomly assigned conditionally 
on W .  The units of observation are no longer individuals i but markets m.  We adopt the 
approach suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004).  They extend the propensity score result 
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 of Rosenbaum and Robin (1983) to the case of a continuous treatment5  and show that the 
unconfoundedness assumption (5) leads to: 
Ei∈m[Yi(z, p)]  ⊥  1{Pm = p} |  f(P = p|Wm),  ∀m, z, p.  (11) 
The function f(·|w) is the conditional density of the treatment P .  It is the counterpart of 
the propensity score in the case of a continuous treatment and is thus called the generalized 
propensity score (GPS thereafter). We then proceed to estimation in three steps. 
a) The ﬁrst sub-step consists in estimating the GPS by regressing P  on (a ﬂexible function 
of) the market variables W .  Denoting this estimate by f Þwe can deﬁne for each market m, 
the estimated value f Þ
m(p) of the GPS for any p: 
fm(p) = f Þ(p|Wm) . Þ
b) We estimate the function that links the market outcome, Ei∈m[Y (z, P )] to the market 
treatment P and the GPS. We thus regress E Þ
i∈m[Y (z, P )] on a ﬂexible (in general quadratic) 
function of P  and f Þ(P ) and denote as Q Þ
z  the resulting function: 













over markets:  Þ









An alternative single-step approach.  The two-step method we have presented above 
involves the estimation of two propensity scores, one at the individual level (for the binary 
treatment Z) and one at the market level (for the continuous treatment P ).  It could thus 
be that the sensitivity issues raised by the estimation of the propensity score (speciﬁcation, 
overlap) add up to yield imprecise and/or unstable estimation results.  For some speciﬁc 
applications, for instance if the “markets” are classrooms or neighborhoods with few units, 
one  might  prefer  a  less  demanding  estimation  procedure  than  our  two-step  method.  In 
Appendix A we present an alternative single-step identiﬁcation and estimation strategy with 
a single CIA. 
5For the case with a multivariate but not necessarily continuous treatment, see Imbens (2001). 
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 Discussion.  We brieﬂy return to the implications of using more conventional “matching” 
estimation  methods  if  the  real  data-generating  process  is  as  described  in  Section  2  and 
Subsection 3.1, i.e. with multiple markets and two CIA. We have already seen at the end of 
Section 2 that within-market “matching” estimation with given P for each market separately 
does not allow for extrapolation to other values of P . For such an extrapolation we need to 
perform the second estimation step above. 
Suppose one would only perform the second step, that is, perform matching at the market 
level, conditioning on the appropriate Wm, and using as market-speciﬁc outcomes simply the 
mean outcomes for Z = 1 and Z = 0 in the market, or their diﬀerence, or their mean weighted 
by P  and 1 − P .  This basically captures the approach used in the literature if the within­
market assignment is randomized or if the single treatment is a group composition.  In our 
case, this method produces a reduced-form estimate of the over-all eﬀect of P in the market 
on mean outcomes in the market.  The within-market average outcomes do not equal the 
average potential outcomes because of the selectivity generated by Xi. Therefore we can not 
deduce the average individual eﬀect of Z, nor do we know the population of individuals to 
which the estimate applies. 
Now consider the estimation of the ATE without consideration of the existence of multiple 
markets.  The perceived treatment is then one-dimensional and equal to Z, whereas P  is 
unobserved.  The  objective  would  be  to  estimate  average  potential  outcomes  that  could 
be expressed as Yz=1  and Yz=0, by assuming a CIA with confounders Xi.  Obviously, this 
approach can not address the causal eﬀect of P . Moreover, if var(Pm) > 0 then a conventional 
matching  estimator  will  compare  individuals  with  each  other  regardless  of  whether  they 
operate  in  the  same  market.  There  is  a  selection  problem  if  Wm  is  not  included  in  Xi, 
because then Wm aﬀects Zi as well as the market-speciﬁc mean potential outcomes. In that 
case the average potential outcomes would be inconsistently estimated. 
4  Application to training policies in France 
In this section, we present our empirical application.  We study the eﬀect of training pro­
grams for unemployed workers in France on the probability of moving from unemployment to 
employment. We ﬁrst give an overview of the French unemployment institutions and training 
system. Then, we present our data at the individual and at the market level. Lastly, we dis­
cuss the econometric model along two lines: the two conditional independence assumptions 
and the model speciﬁcation. 
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 4.1  Training programs for unemployed workers in France
 
We present the general organization of the French training system for job seekers, as well 
as the assignment process of unemployed workers to training programs.  In relation to our 
theoretical model, the former point is key to understand between-market variation in P , while 
the latter helps to interpret within-market variation in Z. We also give some information on 
the content of training programs.  Table 1 lists the acronyms we use below and summarizes 
features of the training system. 
General organization.  The French training system is run by three diﬀerent bodies:  the 
national state, the social partners (trade unions and employer organizations) and the ad­
ministrative regions.  The state funds training programs for the long-term (more than 12 
months) unemployed who have exhausted their rights to unemployment beneﬁts,  as well 
as for welfare recipients.  It also provides revenues to job seekers who are not eligible to 
unemployment beneﬁts and who participate in state-appointed training programs.  In ad­
dition, the state oﬀers training to eligible and non-eligible unemployed through the public 
employment service called ANPE. The role of ANPE is to counsel the unemployed in their 
search activities and to monitor them. Any job seeker who wishes to enter a public training 
program must consult his local ANPE agency. 
The social partners manage the institution in charge of the payment of unemployment 
beneﬁts, called UNEDIC. UNEDIC provides all the funding for the unemployment beneﬁts 
of eligible trainees.  Besides, UNEDIC and its local agencies, called ASSEDIC, are now in 
charge of prescribing and buying speciﬁc training courses for eligible job seekers. 
Finally, the administrative regions are also in charge of funding of training programs. 
Moreover, they express their needs for skills at the local level to ASSEDIC and ANPE agen­
cies, based on the vacancies that are opened every year. The ANPE agencies are then asked 
by law to assign job seekers to training programs suited to the vacancies.  For their part, 
ASSEDIC agencies are in charge of the assignment of eligible job seekers to the training pro­
grams they fund. In all cases, training capacities should be calibrated to ﬁt open vacancies. 
Consequently the probability that an unemployed person is trained depends on local labor 
market conditions. In the framework of our evaluation model, this is a source of variation in 
P  between regions and occupations. 
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 Table 1: The French system of training for the unemployed
 
ANPE  - Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi 
Public employment service, counsels and monitors unemployed workers. 
Run by the state. 
ASSEDIC  - Association pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce 
Local agencies of the UNEDIC. 
BMO  - enquˆ ete Besoin de Main d’Œuvre 
Survey conducted by the ASSEDIC every year since 2001. 
Collects ﬁrms’ job opening predictions for the next year. 
Helps ANPE assign training programs. 
FNA  - Fichier National des ASSEDIC 
National register of unemployed workers. 
UNEDIC  - Union Nationale interprofessionnelle pour l’Emploi Dans l’Industrie et le Commerce 
Institution in charge of paying unemployment beneﬁts. 
Run by the social partners (unions and employers). 
Pays unemployment and welfare beneﬁts. 
(Since 2001) prescribes and buys some speciﬁc training courses. 
Conducts a yearly survey on local labor demand (BMO). 
These tasks are run at the local level by the ASSEDIC agencies. 
Assignment  to  training  programs.  A meeting with an ANPE caseworker (typically 
30 minutes long) is compulsory for all newly registered unemployed workers and recurs at 
least every 6 months.  Depending on the individual’s proﬁle, the caseworker can schedule 
follow-up interviews between two compulsory meetings, and interviews can be requested at 
any moment by the unemployed workers themselves. Apart from a wide range of counselling 
measures, training programs may be proposed to job seekers during interviews or in between 
interviews.  In theory, the job seekers are allowed to accept or refuse any program they are 
proposed, but a refusal can lead to a cut in unemployment beneﬁts.  In practice, however, 
sanctions for refusing a training program are not given. 
Each year since 2001,  the ASSEDIC conduct a survey,  called BMO, on the predicted 
job  vacancies  at  the  local  level  (see  Subsection  4.2  for  more  details  on  this  survey).  In 
particular, the BMO survey intends to give ANPE caseworkers some information to help 
them assign unemployed workers to training programs consistently with the open vacancies. 
Therefore,  the  need  for  speciﬁc  skills  should  be  correlated  with  the  probability  of  being 
treated  at  the  local  level.  In  theory,  the  less  employable  persons  have  priority  to  enter 
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 training programs.  Yet, some recent ﬁeld studies (see e.g.  Fleuret, 2006) show that low­
skilled workers are less likely to accept training, although they are more likely to be proposed 
such programs by caseworkers.  This suggests that self-selection plays a signiﬁcant part in 
training participation.  In Subsection 4.3 we use a rich set of individual characteristics (in 
particular detailed information on an individual’s unemployment and training history) to 
control for this feature.  In Section 6 we address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in 
individual selection into training. 
Job seekers may also ﬁnd training programs by themselves.  Some surveys indicate that 
those programs are generally oriented toward the acquisition of more general human capital. 
In that case the unemployed worker can beneﬁt from some public funding6  to cover the 
program’s tuition costs. This requires that the program be validated by an ANPE caseworker 
who is in charge of checking that the program is somehow relevant given the job seeker’s 
professional project and the local labor demand. A ﬁeld study by Fleuret (2006) also shows 
that low-skilled workers are far less likely to ask for the validation of a training program than, 
for instance, executives.  Finally, it turns out that ANPE caseworkers have much power in 
the assignment process, as they may either prescribe or validate the training programs. 
Contents of training programs.  Unfortunately, the data we use for the empirical anal­
ysis do not contain information on the content of training programs.  However additional 
data provided by UNEDIC make it possible to describe this content with some precision.7 
These data give a set of details on training programs, including a grouping into four types of 
training: “general” (e.g. mathematics, economics, languages), “personal” (e.g. development 
of mental abilities, development of professional organization capacities), “service oriented vo­
cational skills” (e.g.  accounting, hotel business) and “production oriented vocational skills” 
(e.g carpentry, engineering).  While the distribution across types is not uniform, the mass 
is not concentrated on a single type.  For instance, out of the 593 126 programs that took 
place between 2005 and 2007, 17.9% were of the “general” type, 37.5% of the “personal” 
type,  29.9%  were “service  oriented” and 14.7% were “production  oriented”.  Additional 
information is given on the education level of the programs, showing that programs at the 
college level and above account for less than 25% of the total.  Hence, about 75% of train­
ing programs are presumably oriented towards low-skilled workers.  This is in line with the 
objectives of ANPE caseworkers when assigning people to training.  8 
6The funding may come from the administrative regions, the state or UNEDIC, depending on the eligibility 
of the job seeker, and on the content of the program. 
7Due to the lack of common identiﬁers, we cannot merge this additional data set with the one we use in 
our estimation. 
8We do not have information on what types of programs are most frequently proposed by ANPE case­
workers, and what types are mostly chosen by the unemployed. 
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 4.2  The data 
Individual data.  We use quarterly extracts from the FNA, an administrative data set col­
lected by UNEDIC. The FNA ﬁle contains information on all the workers entering unemploy­
ment who are unemployment beneﬁts or welfare recipients. We use eight randomly selected 
extracts of the FNA. Each extract represents 2.5% of unemployed workers between 1990 and 
2007.9  For each individual, the extracted ﬁle mixes information collected by UNEDIC and 
by ANPE on all the unemployment spells that could have occurred since 1990.  It contains 
the dates at which workers are registered and unregistered as unemployed by the public 
employment service, as well as the dates when people enter and exit training. 
We start the analysis in 2002, for three reasons. First, between 1993 and 2001, the time 
proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts was decreasing over the unemployment period. However, for 
unemployed workers who entered a training program, the unemployment beneﬁts remained 
constant until the program stopped. Hence, the system was providing an eligibility incentive 
to enter a program regardless of a causal eﬀect of this program on re-employment. A reform 
in 2001 re-introduced a constant beneﬁt over the whole period of eligibility for unemployment 
insurance. Second, the reform also changed the assignment process, as monitoring by ANPE 
caseworkers has increased after 2001. Lastly, the BMO data we use at the market level (see 
the next paragraph) have been collected since 2001 only. 
We deﬁne the treatment variable Zi  and outcome variable Yi  as follows: 
- Zi  = 1 if i enters a training program within dZ  months as from the beginning of the 
unemployment spell, 0 otherwise. 
- Yi = 1 if i leaves unemployment within dY  months as from the beginning of the unem­
ployment spell, 0 otherwise. 
In our benchmark estimation we set dZ  = 6 months and dY  = 12 months.  We choose 
these values because long-term unemployment is a key statistic in the public debate on un­
employment in France.  Our observations consist of unemployment spells starting either in 
2002 or in 2004.10  We use the following covariates for the estimation of the propensity score 
at the individual level:  age, gender, duration of aﬃliation to the unemployment insurance 
system, unemployment beneﬁts, reference wage (i.e.  wage of the previous job, if any) and 
the time of the year (month) when the unemployment spell started.  To control for individ­
ual labor market histories, we also build two sets of covariates, related respectively to the 
periods [t0 − 2 years,t0] and [t0 − 7 years,t0 − 2 years], where t0  is the starting date of the 
9There can be repetitions across extractions so we have slightly less than 20% of the whole unemployment 
population between 1990 and 2007. 
10We will use a time dimension to deﬁne markets.  Hence, since we assume that markets are segmented, 
we do not consider the inﬂow in 2003 and 2005 in order to minimize the risk of overlap. 
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 unemployment spell. For each period we control for the following characteristics: number of 
unemployment spells, time spent unemployed and time spent in training. We will comment 
on these variables when discussing the CIA at the individual level in Subsection 4.3. 
Market data.  We deﬁne a market m by three characteristics : a region r, an occupation 
o and a time indicator t, m = (r, o, t). 
The regions we consider are deﬁned by the ASSEDIC. They do not match precisely the 
administrative regions.  We solve this issue by aggregating data to the department level. 
Departments are administrative sub-divisions of regions and their deﬁnition is the same in 
all data sets. We had to exclude three regions from our analysis: Aquitaine, Corsica (due to 
matching issues with the BMO) and Limousin (since the number of observations per market 
is too small).  We also exclude all overseas departments, again because we cannot match 
them with the BMO survey. This results in 22 regions. 
We have precise information on the occupation of the job that individuals are looking 
for.  The corresponding variable is coded by a letter (seven categories, broadly deﬁning the 
general occupation) and two digits.  Since we need many observations per market and we 
want these markets to be as isolated as possible from one another, we only keep the broad 
deﬁnition of occupations (seven categories). 
Finally, the time indicator is a dummy equal to one for unemployment spells starting 
in 2002 and to zero for those starting in 2004.  Though limited to two periods, this panel 
dimension of our data potentially allows us to control for unobserved ﬁxed region/occupation 
eﬀects driving the allocation of P .  We return to this in Subsection 4.3 when discussing the 
CIA at the market level. 
¯ The market characteristics Wm  include the means of individual characteristics Xm.  As 
we  have  seen,  the  omission  of  these  would  be  hard  to  defend.  We  also  include  a  labor 
market tightness indicator.  This is constructed from the yearly BMO survey conducted by 
UNEDIC. From 2001 onwards, the BMO collects ﬁrms’ job opening predictions at a very 
detailed level.  More precisely, the BMO is conducted every year in November on all the 
ﬁrms aﬃliated to UNEDIC. For instance, in November 2007, 1 524 557 ﬁrms were asked 
how many vacancies they were planning to post during the year 2008.11  It is thus possible 
to deﬁne the local labor market tightness θ as the number of predicted vacancies over the 
number of unemployed workers.  This variable is a relevant confounder because the BMO 
11The non-response rate is high (more than 75% on average every year).  The actual ﬁgures of vacancies 
are then recovered on the basis of the size, activity and location of the respondent ﬁrms. Note that although 
this would be an issue if we wanted to evaluate precisely labor demand, the BMO predictions of vacancies are 
the actual numbers that ANPE observes when deciding on the allocation of training. Hence the non-response 
rate is not an issue for the assignment to training by ANPE caseworkers. 
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 survey is conducted to help caseworkers assign unemployed workers to the training programs 
that match the skills needed on local labor markets. 
The labor market tightness indicator θ is computed as follows. The number of predicted 
vacancies is constant within a calendar year (due to the design of the BMO survey) but the 
unemployment stock is not. Therefore, we can compute the ratio of vacancies to unemployed 
for each pair (r, o) and each month.  Then, for a market m = (r, o, t) with t = 2002 (resp. 
t = 2004), we compute the labor market tightness θm as the average of all the monthly ratios 
in 2002 and 2003 (resp. 2004 and 2005). 
Descriptive statistics.  Table 2 gives the number of individuals in each market in 2002 
(left column) as well as the proportion of treated individuals (right column) when we deﬁne 
treatment as entering a training program within dZ  = 6 months.  There is heterogeneity in 
market size across regions, from the more rural regions like Auvergne to the Paris region (Ile 
de France), but also across occupations.  Likewise, the proportion of treated varies across 
these two dimensions.  One can also note that we have a large number of observations per 
market,  although  perhaps  not  large  enough  to  run  a  fully  non-parametric  analysis  with 
respect to region and occupation indicators. We discuss this issue in Subsection 4.3. 
Importantly, we note that the proportions of treated are rather low in our data. In 2002, 
the maximum is .136 and only 6 markets have a proportion of treated higher than .1 (the 
numbers are similar in 2004). This will make it very diﬃcult to predict the treatment eﬀect 
when the proportion of treated is above .1.  Our estimation results will thus focus on low 
values of P . 
4.3  Econometric implementation 
Let us ﬁrst sum up the notations.  Individuals (more precisely unemployment spells) are 
denoted by i.  An individual i is in market m = (r, o, t) if Ri  = r, Oi  = o, Ti  = t, in which 
case m(i) = m.  The individual treatment is Zi  and the outcome is Yi.  The confounders 
needed to write the independence assumption (6) form the vector Xi. The market treatment 
variable is Pm, the average of Zi over i ∈ m. The independence assumption (5) at the market 
level involves the market confounders Wm which consist of a local labor market tightness θm, 
the market averages of the individual characteristics Xm and, depending on the speciﬁcation, 
some market indicators (region, occupation or both). The market outcome is the average of 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Assignment to treatment at the individual level.  We discuss our CIA at the indi­
vidual level (6).  This is the typical assumption made in evaluation studies using matching 
estimators on non-experimental data.  Two features are crucial in making this assumption 
credible. First, one should control for local labor market conditions (see Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd, 1997).  Second, it is key to assess a worker “employability” as this feature may 
drive the caseworker’s eﬀort to assign him to a training program (see Sianesi, 2004).  We 
address the ﬁrst issue by controlling for local labor market indicators.  Indeed, assumption 
(6) is made within each market m. 
The  “employability”  issue  is  tackled  using  information  on  individuals’  unemployment 
and training histories.  We start our analysis in 2002 but we observe for any worker all the 
unemployment and training spells he may have experienced between 1990 and 2001. Ideally, 
one would want to use this information to incorporate an unobserved individual eﬀect in 
the CIA (6) and run the ﬁrst step of estimation using ﬁxed- or random-eﬀect techniques. 
However,  we cannot follow this route because of the labor market policy reform in 2001 
that changed the assignment process (so we do not expect the parameters to be constant 
during the 1990-2007 period). Still, we can use individual histories between 1990 and 2001 to 
compute the confounders described in Subsection 4.2 and thus capture part of the individual 
heterogeneity driving unemployment duration and assignment to training. 
In Section 6 we use the longitudinal dimension of our data to show that our estima­
tion results are robust to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  To this end, we apply 
the “Timing-of-Events” approach (see Abbring and Van den Berg,  2003) and control for 
unobserved heterogeneity terms driving both duration until training and unemployment du­
ration.12 
Allocation  of  treatment  across  markets.  We now focus on the CIA at the market 
level (5).  Our identiﬁcation strategy requires that P  be allocated randomly across markets 
conditionally on a set of market characteristics.  We use two very important features of our 
data to assess the validity of this assumption. First, we control for local labor demand using 
the information of the BMO survey. Indeed, the key feature one may think of when discussing 
treatment across labor markets is heterogeneity on the demand side of the market.  This 
dimension is usually not accounted for as most matching studies make use of registered data 
on unemployed workers. The BMO solves this problem by giving the number of job vacancies 
in any local labor market for any year.  Moreover, as we mentioned in Subsection 4.1, the 
12Since the matching approach suggested in Section 3 is more general than the Timing-of-Events approach 
(it does not require duration data) and since the point of this paper is ﬁrst to discuss the SUTVA rather 
than the CIA, our benchmark estimation results will be based,  at the individual level,  only on observed 
confounders. 
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 purpose of the BMO survey is to help ANPE caseworkers allocate training in accordance 
with ﬁrm demand for each type of job. 
The second key feature lies in the longitudinal dimension of our market data. Indeed the 
typical problem in evaluation studies is that one does not know what would have happened 
had a unit been given another treatment status.  Here,  a unit is a market i.e.  a triplet 
(region, occupation, year).  Two of these characteristics are ﬁxed in time, and we have two 
observation for each region/occupation pair.  Therefore, we observe each region/occupation 
pair under two treatment regimes: P  in 2002 and P  in 2004. If there is variation in P  with 
time, we can introduce a market ﬁxed eﬀect among the confounders in (5) and thus control 
13 for unobserved market characteristics in the allocation of P . 
To assess the relevance of this strategy, we may examine the evolution of the proportion 
of treated through time. In Figure 1, we plot for each region/occupation pair the proportion 
of treated in 2004 against that in 2002, together with the 45◦  line.  There is variation in 
P  in most region/occupation cells and this variation can be relatively large (given the low 
values of P ).  Therefore, the data seem well-ﬁtted for our approach.  Yet, one may question 
the precision of our estimates as we only have two dates to compute a market ﬁxed eﬀect. 
We address this concern in Appendix B where we replace our region/occupation ﬁxed eﬀect 
with region and occupation dummies. The results barely change. 
We should make a caveat about the operationalization of the cross-market treatment 
assignment as the fraction of treated eligible individuals in the market.  One may argue 
that the policy maker assigns a budget Bm  to each market,  and that the mapping from 
this budget Bm  to the fraction of treated individuals Pm  also depends on the decisions of 
eligible individuals in the market to participate in the program.  Such decisions depend on 
Xi. However, as we have seen, the decision to enroll is critically aﬀected by the case worker. 
We therefore feel that it is reasonable to capture Bm  by Pm.  More in general, the above 
argument suggests to include many statistics of the within-market distribution of X in the 
vector Wm. For example, one may include a number of quantiles of the marginal distributions 
of the elements of X, and/or correlations of elements of X. 
Speciﬁcations.  The ﬁrst step of the estimation method presented in Subsection 3.2 con­
sists in regressing the binary treatment variable Zi  on the covariates Xi  for each market 
m.  As Table 2 in Subsection 4.2 shows, we might have too few observations per market to 
run a fully non-parametric estimation with respect to the market indicators.  Therefore, we 
include two of the three market characteristics among the vector of regressors in the estima­
13We will make a slight abuse of language and refer to a region/occupation ﬁxed eﬀect as a market ﬁxed 
eﬀect.  For example, executives in Ile-de-France (Paris region) in 2002 and those in 2004 are on diﬀerent 
markets. Yet, our market ﬁxed eﬀect will be a dummy Ile-de-France/executives. 
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 tion of the propensity score. More precisely, for each region r, we regress Zi on Xi,Oi,Ti by 
logit.  We believe that heterogeneity between regions calls for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation. 
In Appendix B, we will show that our results are robust to changes in the speciﬁcation. 
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Once we have estimated p Þ(Xi,m(i)) for all i, we impose a common support condition. 
In  each  market  m,  we  drop  all  treated  (resp.  non-treated)  individuals  whose  predicted 
propensity score is outside the support of the scores of the non treated (resp. of the treated). 
We then estimate the market outcomes Ei∈m[Yi(z, Pm)] using the weighted regression method 
presented in Subsection 3.2. 
The second step consists ﬁrst in predicting the GPS. For the benchmark analysis, we 
regress Pm  on Wm = 
�
Xm,θm,θ2 � 
allowing for a market (actually region/occupation) ﬁxed  m
eﬀect.  In Appendix B, we will show that our results are robust when replacing this market 
ﬁxed eﬀect with region and occupation dummies. We estimate the distribution of the resid­
uals with a kernel and predict the GPS f(P  = p|W ).  We then compute Y Þ
z,p  as explained 
in Subsection 3.2.  We bootstrap this two-step procedure a hundred times and consider the 
mean and standard errors of the resulting distributions.14 
14We  do  not  use  a  nearest-neighbor  matching  estimator  at  either  stage  so  bootstrap  may  be  used  to 
estimate the variance of our estimates (see Abadie and Imbens, 2008, for a case where bootstrap fails to 
work for nearest-neighbor matching estimators). 
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 5  Estimation results 
5.1  The eﬀect of the proportion of treated on individual outcomes 
This section presents our main empirical result: the causal eﬀect of the proportion of treated 
in  a  market  on  the  average  potential  outcomes,  for  the  underlying  full  population.  As 
mentioned  in  Section  2,  if  the  SUTVA  holds  then  Y1,p  and  Y0,p  should  not  vary  with  p. 
Figures 2a-2b display the estimates of these as functions of p.  The dashed lines delimit the 
conﬁdence interval. Each dot on the graphs corresponds to a value of p actually observed in 
the data. As mentioned in Section 4, we can only predict the two average potential outcomes 
of interest for values of p below 15%.  Lastly, note that the scale of the y-axis is diﬀerent 
between Figure 2a and Figure 2b (Y0,p  is actually more precisely estimated than Y1,p). 
The most striking features of these two graphs are that i) neither Y Þ
1,p  nor Y0,p  remains Þ
constant when p varies and ii) both decrease when p increases. These are the main empirical 
ﬁndings of this paper.  The ﬁrst point, i), shows that in our data, the SUTVA is violated, 
since an individual’s potential outcome does depend on whether many or few people in his 
market are treated.  The second result,  ii),  indicates that the proportion of treated in a 
market has a negative eﬀect on the potential outcomes under treatment as well as under no 
treatment. 
Taking a closer look at Figures 2a-2b, we note a few diﬀerences between the patterns of 
Y1,p  and Y Þ
0,p.  The former shows some concavity while the latter seems to be convex.  The Þ
outcome of treated individuals is almost constant for the very low values of p and starts to 
decrease once p is above .03. This does not necessarily mean that the SUTVA is correct for 
low values of p.  Indeed, the slope of the outcome of non treated is the steepest when p is 
small and becomes less negative as p increases.  While Y Þ
0,p  seems almost constant when p 
is around .1, we cannot assess whether it will then become increasing since we observe very 
few markets with values of P  above .1 (and none above .15). 
The magnitude of the eﬀect of p on the average potential outcomes in Figures 2a-2b may 
not seem impressive, but note that the range of values for p is small: from .021 to .136. Our 
results show that even small changes in p aﬀect the potential outcomes. 
In Appendix B we show that our empirical results are robust to a series of tests.  These 
concern changes in the speciﬁcation of the econometric model at each step of the estimation 
(see also Section 6, where we address the crucial issue of unobserved individual heterogeneity 
and show that we get similar results when using the “Timing-of-Events” approach). We also 
show that choosing other dates for the observation of the treatment status and the outcome 
does not aﬀect the results. 
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In sum, the potential outcomes for treatment and non-treatment decrease with p.  For 
Y0,p, the slope seems to vanish when p increases beyond .10, but there are very few markets  Þ
with P > .10. For the range of common values (between .02 and .10), both average potential 
outcomes are signiﬁcantly decreasing. 
Our approach does not give an explanation for these results.  In the remainder of this 
subsection we discuss some possible explanations based on the structural models mentioned 
in Section 1, but we leave a thorough investigation for further research.  First, if training 
increases individual productivity, it could be that ﬁrms would prefer a worker who just exited 
a training program over a non-treated worker. This would make Y0,p decrease as p increases. 
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 At the same time, if more people are treated, then a treated worker will be competing with 
more treated workers who, contrary to non treated, are as productive as him.  Hence, Y1,p 
can be non-increasing with respect to p because of competition for jobs within the group of 
treated. This is the crowding-out argument mentioned in Section 1. 
If the proportion of treated increases, and if training improves productivity, then ﬁrms 
may have an incentive to open more job vacancies, in particular more vacancies for skilled 
(trained) individuals.  If search is undirected, i.e.  if ﬁrms cannot target speciﬁcally treated 
or non-treated workers before a hiring interview, then an increase in labor demand may also 
beneﬁt non-treated workers. 
The size of a negative (resp.  positive) eﬀect of crowding-out (resp.  a labor demand 
response) on outcomes depends on wage determination. If workers have some market power 
(through e.g. bargaining over wages or on-the-job search), the increase in productivity due to 
training might not convert fully into an increase in ﬁrms’ proﬁt, as workers can get a share of 
the additional surplus. This will aﬀect both ﬁrms’ response to an increase in the treatment 
probability  p  (potentially  leading  to  less  job  creation),  and  their  relative  preferences  for 
treated and non-treated workers (ﬁrms might not prefer to hire treated workers if wages 
are too high).  In any case, our results seem to be consistent with an explanation that is 
primarily driven by crowding-out eﬀects in a labor market with imperfect information and 
search frictions. 
All these issues motivate further research. This is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Recall that the main points of the paper are to show that such interactions can take place, to 
show that they aﬀect the evaluation of the treatment, and to suggest an evaluation method 
when the SUTVA no longer holds. 
5.2  Average treatment eﬀects 
Figures 2a-2b point at a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the market dimension of the treatment on the 
average individual potential outcomes. This feature implies that p is as important as z when 
assessing the eﬀect of the treatment. To illustrate this, let us compute the average treatment 
eﬀects. We show δ Þ1,0 =  as a function of p in Figure 3a and δ Þ1,0 =  in Figure  p,p  Y1,p−Y Þ
0,p  p,p  Y1,p−Y Þ
0,p  Þ Þ
3b, where p if the lowest value of P  observed in our data.15  In order to draw comparisons 
between these two functions, we use the same scale for the y-axis in both graphs. 
15Obviously, δ Þ1,0  is just  Þ shifted downwards.  p,p  Y1,p 
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Figures 3a-3b illustrate the discussion on average treatment eﬀects in Subsection 2.2. 
Consider an econometrician who, in order to estimate the eﬀect of the treatment, proceeds 
to  a  controlled  experiment  in  a  group  of  workers  and  thus  allocates  Z  randomly  across 
individuals.  This approach will yield an unbiased estimate of the average treatment eﬀect 
conditionally on p = E(Z) but, since the SUTVA is violated, he cannot ensure whether this 
eﬀect remains the same should the proportion of treated increase or decrease.  Looking at 
Figure 3a, we see that, for values of p above .04, an increase in the proportion of treated leads 
to a more negative treatment eﬀect.  One can argue that the decrease in δ1,0  is small.  Still,  p,p 
the violation of the SUTVA may be important for the evaluation of the treatment for two 
reasons.  First, as this was the case for the outcomes in Figures 2a-2b, we observe changes 
in the treatment eﬀect even though p varies within a narrow range.  Secondly, even if the 
treatment eﬀect was constant with p, the fact that the outcomes of treated and non-treated 
workers decrease with the proportion of treated indicates that the treatment is far from 
having no eﬀect. 
Figure 3b allows us to complete the evaluation of the treatment by comparing the out­
comes of treated individuals in a market with P  = p with those of non-treated individuals 
in a market with the lowest value of P  (ideally, we would like to have p = 0).  We see that 
treated individuals have a smaller probability of leaving unemployment within the year than 
workers who are not treated in a market where very few people are treated. This is as close 
as we can get to a “pure” eﬀect of the treatment i.e.  an eﬀect where the counterfactual is 
the situation with no treatment at all. While the decrease in δ1,0 in Figure 3a was of a small  p,p 
magnitude, the fall in δ1,0  shown in Figure 3b is substantial.  p,p 
As a sensitivity analysis, we replicate the above estimations separately for small and large 
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 markets as deﬁned by the number of unemployed individuals. The results (not shown here) 
are very similar to those presented. 
Overall, our empirical analysis paints a negative picture of training programs. Figure 3a 
shows that treated workers are always more likely than non-treated workers to experience 
long-term unemployment and Figures 2a-2b and 3b show that an individual’s probability to 
leave unemployment within 12 months is negatively aﬀected by others’ treatment status. We 
shall now give a few precisions in defense of training programs.  First, these programs can 
take time and while participating, an individual can devote less time and eﬀort to job search. 
This is the well-known “locking-in” eﬀect. Also, the purpose of training programs is not only 
to help workers re-access employment earlier but also to allow them to acquire some skills 
that will facilitate their access to more stable jobs. A recent study by Cr´ epon, Ferracci and 
Foug` ere (2007) on French data showed,  using a “Timing-of-Events” model,  that training 
programs have almost no eﬀect on unemployment duration but signiﬁcantly increase the 
duration of the subsequent job. What had not been shown so far by the empirical literature 
on training programs is the global eﬀects of these treatments on local labor markets i.e. the 
evolution of outcomes with p as shown in Figures 2a-2b and 3a-3b. 
6  Allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
Obviously, testing the SUTVA requires validity of the CIA. However, without experimental 
data where assignment to treatment is random, we cannot ensure that no unobserved con­
founder drives both the outcomes and the treatment status.  At the market level, since we 
observe markets (region/occupation) under diﬀerent treatment regimes, we can control for 
an unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect in the allocation of P .  In this section, we suggest a method to 
control also for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. To this end, we use the fact 
that both our outcome and treatment variables result from duration processes.  Using the 
“Timing-of-Events” (ToE thereafter) approach, we can impose parametric assumptions on 
the distributions of these durations and control for ﬁxed unobserved individual eﬀects that 
drive them both (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003).  Then, we will be able to compute 
our average outcomes at the market level, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, and go 
to the second step of the estimation method we presented in Section 3.  We do not use 
this method for our benchmark results because the matching approach we have presented in 
Section 3 is more general as it does not require duration data. 
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 � ��). 
6.1  The “Timing-of-Events” approach 
We consider two duration processes: TZ and TY (tZ ), both starting at date t = 0. The former 
is the duration until treatment while the latter is the potential unemployment duration if 
treated at date tZ .  The hazard rates of these two processes depend on individual observed 
heterogeneity, X, and on an unobserved heterogeneity term, denoted as vZ  for duration TZ 
and as vY  for TY .  Importantly, vZ  and vY  can be correlated and if this is the case, a CIA 
based solely on observed confounders will not permit identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect. 
The ToE literature, initiated by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), suggests a way out of 
this issue, which consists in making the three following assumptions. 
First, one has to make a “no-anticipation” assumption. This assumption is crucial for the 
interpretation of unemployment spells that end before treatment.  Cr´ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet 
and Van den Berg (2009) discuss this in detail for the “matching” approach.  Denoting by 
fA|B  the conditional density of A given B we assume: 
fTY (t�)|X,vY (t) = fTY (t��)|X,vY (t),  ∀t ≤ min(t ,t (12) 
Assumption (12) means that there is a unique process ruling unemployment duration prior to 
treatment.  It implies that an individual has the same probability of leaving unemployment 
today whether he is going to be treated tomorrow or a year from now. 
We  also  need  a  CIA,  but  now,  the  outcomes  and  treatment  of  interest  are  potential 
durations and the conditioning involves unobserved confounders v = (vZ ,vY ): 
TY (tZ )  ⊥  TZ  |  X, vZ ,vY ,  ∀tZ .  (13) 
Note that (13) implies (6) where the conditioning is on both X and (vZ ,vY ).  Lastly, if the 
CIA (13) involves unobserved individual characteristics, we need to put some structure on 
the hazard rates of TZ  and TY (tZ ), denoted, respectively, by hTZ |X,vZ  and hTY (tZ )|X,vY .  The 
ToE approach requires mixed proportional hazard rates, 
hTZ |X,vZ (t) =  λZ (t) · φZ (X) · exp (vZ ) ,  (14) 
hTY (tZ )|X,vY (t) =  λY (t) · φY (X) exp (δZ 1 {t > tZ } + vY ) , 
where λZ and λY  are piecewise constant functions.16  Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) show 
16This means that we have an integer KZ , intervals (IZk)0<k≤KZ  ⊂ R+ , IZk ∩ IZk�  = ∅ if k � k�, and  = 
KZ
positive scalars (λZk) such that:  λZ (t) = 
� 
λZk · 1{t ∈ IZk}.  The same goes for λY  with diﬀerent  0<k≤KZ 
k=1 
intervals and scalars. 
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 that all parameters of this model are identiﬁed (up to a multiplicative constant in the λ’s) 
and also that one can recover the distribution of (vZ ,vY ). 
So far in this section, we have not used market indicators.  In theory, one could allow 
for all the parameters and functions of the above model to be market speciﬁc.  However 
in practice the ToE approach demands a large number of observations.  We thus consider 
one model for the whole economy and introduce region, occupation and year dummies in 
the regressors X  and, importantly, in the treatment eﬀect.  Therefore, in equations (14), 
φZ  and  φY  are  log-linear  functions  of  (X, R, O, T )  and  the  treatment  parameter  δZ  is  a 
linear function of (R, O, T ).  The treatment eﬀect thus varies across markets.  Note that 
this speciﬁcation leads us to assume only one distribution of (vZ ,vY ) in the economy (i.e. 
unobserved heterogeneity is not market-speciﬁc). 
We  assume  that  the  pair  (vZ ,vY )  can  take  R  values  in  (R∗+)
2 .  We  denote  by  q(v) 
the  probability  that  (vZ ,vY )  takes  a  given  value  v.  The  correlation  between  vZ  and  vY 
will indicate whether conditional independence between treatment and outcomes requires 
unobserved confounders. 
Once we know the parameters of the model and the distribution of heterogeneity, we can 
compute estimates of the two outcomes of interest:  Ei∈m [Y (1,Pm)] and E Þ
i∈m [Y (0,Pm)], Þ
using the estimated distributions of TZ  and TY  (see the details in Appendix C). 
6.2  Results 
The ﬁrst step now consists in maximizing the likelihood of observed durations (TY ,TZ ) (pos­
sibly censored) over all spells in the economy. We ﬁrst present the distribution of individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, allowing for R = 4 groups. 
Table 3: Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
group 1:  exp (v ÞZ ) = .000076  exp (v ÞY ) = .34  q(v) = .019 
group 2:  exp (v ÞZ ) = .086  exp (v ÞY ) = 15.1  q(v) = .413 
group 3:  exp (v ÞZ ) = .000039  exp (v ÞY ) = 11.9  q(v) = .357 
group 4:  exp (v ÞZ ) = .0080  exp (v ÞY ) = 3.7  q(v) = .211 
Table 3 indicates that unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in both hazard rates. Impor­
tantly, the two unobserved factors driving TZ  and TY  are not independent as the covariance 
between exp (v ÞZ ) and exp (Þ vY ) equals .122.  We thus need to control for unobserved hetero­
geneity in the allocation of treatment across individuals. Note that vZ  and vY  are positively 
31 correlated  so  individuals  with  the  highest  propensity  to  leave  unemployment  tend  to  be 
assigned to treatment earlier. 
The evaluation of the treatment shown in Section 5 might thus be biased because of 
heterogeneity. Does this aﬀect our main results (violation of the SUTVA and negative eﬀect 
of p on average outcomes)? We can answer this question by using the distributions of TZ and 
TY (tZ ) estimated in the ﬁrst step to predict market average outcomes E Þ
i∈m [Y (1,Pm)] and 
Ei∈m [Y (0,Pm)] and then running the second step of our estimation method (see Subsection  Þ
3.2). This two-step method where, in the ﬁrst step, standard matching has been replaced by 
ToE, controls for unobserved ﬁxed heterogeneity at both the individual (ToE) and market 
(ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation of the GPS) levels. We show in Figures 4a-4b the estimation 
results on both outcomes. 
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Results controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity 
It is clear from Figures 4a-4b that controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
does not aﬀect our two main results: both Y1,p and Y0,p vary with p and these two functions 
show  a  decreasing  pattern.17  As  it  was  the  case  in  Figure  2b,  Y0,p  seems  to  be  convex. 
However Y1,p no longer shows any concavity (see Figure 2a) and substantially decreases with 
p even for small values of p. These results are crucial for our analysis as they show that the 
SUTVA is violated even when one controls for unobserved heterogeneity at both levels of 
the analysis. 
Lastly, we look at the eﬀect of the treatment on the hazard rate of TY , δZ  (see equation 
14).  To this end, we consider the δZ  parameters we have estimated for each market in the 
17We cannot directly compare the levels of Yz,p  in Figures 2a-2b and 4a-4b because the ToE approach 
identiﬁes hazard rates only up to a multiplicative constant. 
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 ﬁrst step using the ToE approach and use them as the market outcomes of interest in our 
second step. We thus have to assume that the CIA (5) holds when replacing Ei∈m [Y (z, Pm)], 
z = 0, 1 with δZm, where δZm  is the eﬀect of treatment on the hazard rate of TY  in market 
m.  18  We plot the estimated function p → δZ (p) in Figure 5.  Consistently with what we 
found using the matching approach (see Figures 3a-3b), δZ (p) shows a decreasing pattern, 
indicating that workers participating in training programs stay longer in unemployment as 
the proportion of treated in their local labor market increases. 
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7  Conclusion 
Evaluation  with  non-experimental  data  usually  requires  two  critical  assumptions.  First, 
the treated individuals and the comparison individuals should on average be as similar as 
possible except for their treatment status, in order to mimic randomization.  Secondly, an 
individual’s  outcome  should  not  depend  on  other  individuals’  treatment  statuses.  With 
matching methods, these are the CIA and the SUTVA. There is a tension between these 
assumptions.  The more similar two individuals are, the more likely it is that they act in 
each others’ proximity,  which makes it more likely that their outcomes interfere.  In this 
paper we design and apply a method to overcome this and, indeed, to estimate the degree of 
interference.  Our extension of the Rubin model (1974) does not impose the SUTVA at the 
individual level, thus allowing for interactions between individuals. In our empirical analysis, 
we focus on training program participation by unemployed individuals.  The results show 
that the estimated mean potential outcomes of both treated and non-treated job seekers 
18Note that the CIA at the market level would then involve the marginal eﬀect of training on hazard rates. 
This seems less realistic than assuming that the outcome of interest for the authorities is the proportion of 
people still unemployed after a year. 
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 depend signiﬁcantly, and negatively, on the proportion of individuals treated in the relevant 
local labor market.  Since the application builds on a general statistical model and a large­
scale  data  set,  we  view  these  results  as  strong  empirical  support  of  the  increasing  focus 
on interactions, in economic research in general, and research on treatment evaluations in 
particular. 
One of the main features of our approach is its ﬂexibility with respect to the estimation 
techniques used at each stage.  We exploit this feature in a sensitivity analysis, by using 
the  Timing-of-Events  method  rather  than  propensity  score  matching,  and  we  show  that 
individual unobserved heterogeneity does not qualitatively aﬀect our results.  It would be 
interesting to take our two-step approach to other data sets,  as the issue of interactions 
between units applies to many ﬁelds in social sciences and our model is general enough to 
be used in a large number of empirical applications. The ﬁrst obvious application would be 
to use our approach with data from a natural or controlled experiment. Another application 
would  consist  in  using  a  structural  model  to  describe  interactions  within  markets.  For 
instance, we could build on the recent developments in the labor economic literature (see 
Lise, Seitz and Smith, 2005) to run a structural estimation of the treatment eﬀect in the ﬁrst 
stage and then resort to more reduced-form models at the second stage. One can also tackle 
the second stage with a theoretical model in order to explain the allocation of treatment 
across markets.  For instance, it could be that the authorities decide to allocate treatment 
resources  across  regions  in  order  to  reach  a  social  optimum.  This  approach  would  then 
merge the structural treatment literature with the recent contributions of Graham, Imbens 
and Ridder (2006) and Bhattacharya and Dupas (2009) which explicitly study the optimal 
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 APPENDIX 
A	  A alternative single-step identiﬁcation and estima­
tion approach 
The alternative approach consists in considering the pair (Zi,Pm(i)) as an individual treatment. 




to write an unconfoundedness assumption at the individual level:  m(i)
Yi(z, p)  ⊥  (Zi,Pm(i))  |  Xi,Wm(i),  ∀i, z, p,	  (A1) 
and thus identify E[Y (z, p)] over the population of individuals. 
Estimation is then straightforward as one can directly apply the method of Hirano and Imbens 
(2004) for a continuous treatment.  Note that the estimation of the propensity score can be done 
in two steps by estimating ﬁrst the density of P  conditional on (X, W ) and then the density of Z 
given (X, W, P = p). 
This approach diﬀers from our two-step method not only because of the estimation procedure 
but also, and more crucially, because it is based on diﬀerent independence assumptions. The main 
diﬀerence is that the allocation of P  operates at the market level in our two-step approach and 
at  the  individual  level  in  the  alternative  approach.  We  think  of  (5)  and  (6)  as  more  intuitive 
assumptions than (A1) since they do not lead one to overlook the two dimensions of the treatment. 
B	  Robustness checks:  Econometric speciﬁcation 
Market speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst step.  Our estimation method requires to estimate average 
outcomes Ei∈m [Yi(1,Pm)] and Ei∈m [Yi(0,Pm)] for each market m. This means that we should run 
the ﬁrst step presented in Subsection 4.2 within any market.  This demands far more observations 
per market than we have.  Therefore, as mentioned in Subsection 4.3, rather than estimating one 
propensity score for each region/occupation/year cell,  we include occupation and year dummies 
in  the  set  of  regressors  (together  with  the  confounders  X)  and  run  one  estimation  per  region. 
This leads to the benchmark results presented in Section 5.  We chose to be non parametric with 
respect to the region variables since administrative regions play an important role in the French 
training system (see Subsection 4.1).  Yet, one could ask whether this choice has an inﬂuence on 
the results.  Therefore, we proceed to an estimation in which, in the ﬁrst step, propensity scores 
are now estimated non parametrically with respect to the occupation variable while region and 
year dummies are included as regressors.  Results are shown in Figures B1a-B1b. They are almost 
similar to those of the benchmark estimation (shown in Figures 2a-2b). 
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One estimation of the propensity score per occupation 
Market speciﬁcation in the second step.  The CIA at the market level requires that P 
be allocated randomly across markets conditionally on characteristics W .  An important feature 
of our estimation method is that we include in W  a region/occupation ﬁxed eﬀect, using the fact 
that we observe each region/occupation twice (in 2002 and 2004). Since we only have two dates to 
estimate the market ﬁxed eﬀect, we could doubt the precision of our predictions.  To address this 
issue, we re-run our method using this time both a region and an occupation dummy in the second 
step (in the estimation of the GPS). This speciﬁcation controls for a region and an occupation ﬁxed 
eﬀect but does not allow for an interaction between these two eﬀects. Results are shown in Figures 
B2a-B2b.  The two main conclusions (the SUTVA is rejected and outcomes signiﬁcantly decrease 
with p) are reinforced. 
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Region and occupation dummies in the estimation of the GPS 
Changing the dates when treatment and outcome are measured.  In our benchmark 
results, treatment status is measured dZ  = 6 months after unemployment starts whereas the out­
come Y  equals one if the individual has left unemployment within dY  = 12 months.  In Figure 
B3a-B3b, we show estimation results when setting (dZ ,dY ) = (9, 15) months.  The two outcomes 
are still decreasing with p although Y Þ0,p seems to be more convex than in Figure 2b. 
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(dZ ,dY ) = (9, 15) 
C	  The  Timing-of-Events  approach:  derivation  of  the 
predicted outcomes 
The two market outcomes of interest Ei∈m [Yi(1,Pm)] and Ei∈m [Yi(0,Pm)] can be derived from the 
distributions of TZ and TY (tZ ). Consider the probabilities of having left unemployment at dY  when 
treated at tZ , conditionally on tZ < dZ  and tZ ≥ dZ  respectively.  Using the CIA (13) we have: 
dZ −1
Prim (TZ = tZ )
Yi(1,Pm) = 
� �
q(v) · Prim (TY (tZ ) ≤ dY ) ·	  ,
Prim (TZ < dZ )
tZ =1  v 
+∞ Prim (TZ = tZ )
Yi(0,Pm) = 
� �
q(v) · Prim (TY (tZ ) ≤ dY ) ·  ,
Prim (TZ ≥ dZ )
tZ =dZ	  v 
The probabilities Prim are market speciﬁc and conditional on Xi,v. Remember that dZ  and dY  are 
the dates when the treatment and unemployment status are checked (respectively 6 and 12 months 
for our benchmark estimation results). We can rewrite these two equalities as follows: 





1 − STY (tZ )|Xi,vY (dY  + 1)
� 
·  ,
1 − STZ |Xi,vZ (dZ )
tZ =1  v 





1 − STY (tZ )|Xi (dY  + 1)
� 
·  . 
STZ |Xi (dZ )
tZ =dZ	  v 
The second equality involves a sum from dZ  to inﬁnity.  To simplify this expression, note that the 
no-anticipation assumption (12) and the MPH speciﬁcation (14) allow us to write: 





1 − STY (tZ )|Xi,vY (dY  + 1)
� 
· 
STZ |Xi,vZ (dZ )
v	 tZ =dZ 
STZ |Xi,vZ (dY  + 1) 
+ 
�
1 − STY (dY +1)|Xi,vY (dY  + 1)
� 
·  . 
STZ |Xi,vZ (dZ ) 
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